In the moral and philosophical, as well as legal and political analyses and discussions of terrorism, there remain two topics or issues that still do not receive the attention due them:
First, in mass media reporting and commentary, as well as in public political rhetoric (especially among politicians of all stripes) more generally, there remains comparatively little discussion of “state terrorism.” In the U.S., there is ignorance, motivated or willful and otherwise (e.g., as a result of poor education, lack of sufficient exposure to the requisite information, etc.), of the times and places in which this country has resorted to what is in fact state terrorism (e.g., the bombing of Dresden; the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of numerous Japanese cities in WW II; as well the napalm carpet bombing Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during its war in Indochina). And of course the U.S. is not alone in this regard, we need only look at ample historical examples dating back to the early twentieth century. And the resort to same has not been confined to the world’s most powerful nation-states: of late, Saudi Arabia (in Yemen), Syria, and Israel come quickly to mind in the Middle East. Most of us are no doubt familiar with so-called “lone-wolf” (a horrific term, as this is the sort of violent behavior that is peculiar to human beings, not non-human animals) terrorist acts, dedicated terrorist groups (like al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and to some extent the Taliban), or groups like the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Hamas that have used acts of terrorism as part of larger and legitimate political and military campaigns and struggles. I am not attempting an exhaustive list or categorization here but want merely to highlight the comparative breadth and depth of attention accorded non-state terrorism. There are a number of possible and plausible reasons which might help us account for if not explain this difference, but we can leave that to a later date.
Second, and with some notable exceptions (e.g., Scott Atran and his research collaborators), there has been little work devoted to the socio-psychological motivations, contexts, and variables that help us make some sense or provide some kind of social scientific understanding and perhaps even explanation of the political and psychological motivations and socialization of those who commit terrorist acts. We prefer to vociferously and self-righteously moralize, judge, or condemn before engaging in sincere or well-intentioned attempts at understanding. At the very least, we could be more modest or circumspect in our moralizing and judgments until we have undertaken the arduous task of understanding.1 Atran exemplified the seeds of such an attempt in a piece he wrote some years ago in Foreign Policy:
“… terrorist plotters against Western civilian populations tend not to be parts of sophisticated, foreign-based command-and-control organizations. Rather, they belong to loose, homegrown networks of family and friends who die not just for a cause, but for each other. Jihadists pretty much span the population’s normal distribution: There are very few psychopaths and sociopaths, few brilliant thinkers and strategists. Jihadi wannabes today are mostly emerging adults in transitional stages of their lives—students, immigrants, in search of jobs or companions—who are especially prone to movements that promise a meaningful cause, camaraderie, adventure, and glory. Most have a secular education, becoming ‘born again’ into the jihadi cause in their late teens or 20s. The path to radicalization can take years, months, or just days, depending on personal vulnerabilities and the influence of others. Occasionally there is a hook-up with a relative, or a friend of a friend, who has some overseas connection to someone who can get them a bit of training and motivation to pack a bag of explosives or pull a trigger, but the Internet and social media are usually sufficient for radicalization and even operational preparation.”
Related but distinguishable from this concern is the paucity of evidence and knowledge we have about the actual and possible “de-radicalization” of terrorists, one exception to the rule being in the case of “jihadist” Islamists: please see Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements (Routledge, 2009).2 In addition to Irish Republicans, I suspect there are instances of this among former Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) members and Naxalite-Maoist insurgents in India as well as among Communists who have resorted to terrorist acts in Nepal.
One should keep in mind that the endeavor to understand and in some measure explain this kind of political violence at the individual level is not at all equivalent to proffering a moral justification, ideological rationalization, or legal excuse for putative or real terrorist acts.
Notes
1. For a brilliant attempt to address some of the facets of this problem, please see: G.A. Cohen’s essay, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?” in Cohen’s posthumously published volume edited by Michael Otsuka, Finding Oneself in the Other (Princeton University Press, 2013): 115-142.
2. Further reading along these lines:
- Atran, Scott. Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (Ecco/Harper/Collins, 2010).
- Bjørgo, Tore and John Horgan, eds. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (Routledge, 2009).
- Boulden, Jane and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11 (Indiana University Press, 2004).
- Gambetta, Diego, ed. Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Horgan, John. Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (Routledge, 2009).
- Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
Relevant Bibliographies
Comments