Mike Dorf has a wise post about the relationship between the structure of our Constitution and the debt crisis (here). His argument is that the system of checks and balances has played an integral role in creating the crisis: "To paint with a very broad brush, if you think that the aggregate risks of government making changes to the status quo are greater than the risks of doing nothing, you will favor a separation-of-powers regime like our own. Conversely, if you think that on average, the risks of doing nothing are greater than the risks of bad government action, you will favor a parliamentary system.
"Certainly in the current situation, it is easy to see how our Constitution is contributing to the basic problem, because the greater danger is posed by inaction. If we had a fully Democratic Congress (including a large enough majority in the Senate to override a filibuster), the debt ceiling would be raised. Ditto if we had a fully Republican Congress and a Republican President. Neither party would want to be clearly on the hook for the economic disaster that would follow. But with divided government, we get brinksmanship that could actually lead to default, which anyone with any sense at all will agree is a terrible outcome. We could end up there nonetheless because divided government means that no one knows for sure who will be blamed. Or as Wilson put it: 'If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be trusted, in order that when things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished.'"
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