In a rather skeptical if not cynical discussion of “empirical research and law schools” over at MoneyLaw, Jeffrey Harrison concludes, first, that law professors resist acquaintance with or themselves resorting to empirical research “for two reasons: [they] are threatened by what they do not know and law professors [are (I’ve changed the verb tense)] concerned about what the numbers would show.” At least that’s been the case up until now. And that seems true enough.
But more interestingly, he also believes “the future is ‘brighter.’ Well maybe not brighter but different. Law professors are likely to embrace empirical efforts as long as the results are the “right” ones and some empirical work will be valued.”
In response, I wrote (slightly edited):
If we’re not inclined to think that certain cognitive biases: confirmation, expectation, focusing and framing effects, etc. (apart from, in addition to, or in conjuction with more obvious ideological prejudices and distortions), are wholly determinative in the case of empirical research, as the post appears to argue or insinuate, then we are still faced with other issues and problems worthy of our attention. Put differently, even a less skeptical or cynical take on matters leaves us with much to think about when it comes to the place and value of empirical research in legal studies.
I think many of the problems associated with the current condition of empirical research in the law (and in some measure elsewhere in the academy) also arise from uncritical adoption of the methods found in contemporary economics by Law & Economics devotees, a problem not wholly transcended by the recent turn to behavioral economics among some in the profession. People writing in this genre often seem wholly unaware of critiques of the methods of these economists by S.M. Amadae, Deirdre McCloskey, Philip Mirowski, Amartya Sen, Daniel Hausman, Michael S. Mcpherson, Ian Shapiro, and Elizabeth Anderson, among others.
And there’s not enough appreciation of philosophy of science (of both the natural and social sciences) for thinking through empirical questions, hence little appreciation of the meanings of induction (see here especially the work of the philosopher of science, John D. Norton), the use of models, the role of analogical and metaphorical reasoning, hermeneutics, debates surrounding methodological individualism, and so forth and so on.
Relatedly, there’s often uncritical adoption of the latest fad or fashion in the sciences (or latest fashionable science), be it from neuroscience (cf. the recent compelling critiques by Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson), cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, what have you. The nascent character of such sciences should give one pause but....
It perhaps goes without saying that one of the more recalcitrant issues here revolves around the belief that the natural sciences are the repository for the kinds of models and standards, the analytical “robustness” and “rigor,” that we should imitate in the social sciences. Now we need not draw hard and fast boundaries between these two basic kinds of science (after all, we have sufficient reason to label them both ‘science’), but I think there are a host of reasons that we should take care not to elide the very real distinctions here between natural and social science.
For example, when folks hear the word “empirical” in this context they often call to mind “quantitative social science,” of which, after Elster, there are three principal varieties: measurement, data analysis (i.e., statistical analysis), and modeling. Such social science is often oversold if only because it trades too heavily on the mantle and mitre of “hard” science (i.e., the epistemic authority of the natural sciences). Elster himself discusses many of the neglected problems of such science in his book, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (2007). Elster avers, “An interesting question in the psychology and sociology of science is how many *secret practitioners* there are of economic science fiction—hiding either from themselves or from others the fact that this is indeed what they are practicing.” Here, what counts for epistemic rigor or robustness has to do with “numbers” or mathematics, specifically, “ingenious mathematical models” that have little or no anchor in everyday “reality” (as is often the case in economics) and thus are utterly irrelevant with respect to social policy (cf. several books by Deirdre McCloskey, critiques by Nicholas Rescher in his works on epistemology and objectivity, as well as Theodore M. Porter’s Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, 1995). Of course there’s nothing intrinsically wrong with being attracted to the elegance and parsimony exemplified in mathematics and mathematical modeling, but one has to make an argument for its relevance or significance in place of, or as a complement to, other methods in the social sciences.
In addition to the authors and titles mentioned above, I would recommend (in no particular order) the following by way of reflecting on the virtues and vices of current empirical practices in legal research, in other words, by way of thinking of its possible constraints: the considerable literature on hermeneutics commencing with works by Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer (and the subsequent debate between Gadamer and Habermas), Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences (1991), John Dupré, Human Nature and the Limits of Science (2001), Richard W. Miller, Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences (1987), Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences (1996), Martin Warner, Philosophical Finesse: Studies in the Art of Rational Persuasion (1989), Steven Horst, Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science (2007), Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (2008), Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds., Problems and Method in the Study of Politics (2004), Daniel D. Hutto, ed., Narrative and Understanding Persons (2007), and, last but not least, Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002).
Addendum: My friend Jeff Lipshaw (of the Legal Profession Blog) made the following (and typically) sensible remarks as part of a larger comment thread on a post at The Faculty Lounge by John Inazu (in response to some reflections by Brian Leiter on Empirical Legal Studies):
“Personally, I welcome the fact that people like Bill Henderson have made themselves experts on statistical and empirical techniques; like all interdisciplinary inquiry, however, the trick is to know enough about it to ask the right questions, but remain distant enough to supply competing concepts or questions. As in all disciplines, that distance may be tough once you’ve co-opted yourself into the discipline. I do think that complex empirical modeling can mask a lot of questionable analysis. I posted a blog note a few years back after reading the fine print in Bebchuk’s ‘Lucky Directors’ and ‘Lucky CEOs’ that purported to show they had to be manipulating or backdating option issuance. I thought that the assumptions the authors made about what constituted normal or recurring option grants was simply inaccurate. But one had to dig extensively to get there. I’ve also encountered the empirical equivalent of the joke about somebody searching under a streetlight for a lost piece of jewelry. An observer [asks], ‘why are you looking there? You lost it across the street.’ To which the searcher replies, ‘yes, but there’s no light over there.’ You hear from time to time this response to the complaint that the data is not very robust: ‘yes, but it’s all we have.’”
[Apologies to those who may have read these or similar comments on this subject by me elsewhere in the legal blogosphere.]